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MILLER

v; DYER

[20 C. (2d)

Oaldwell, 41 Cal. '611. See, also, Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Contracts, 3d ed., p. 900). In Linehan v. Devincense,
170 Cal. 307 [149 Pac. 584], the vendee failed to show an
existing contract and his unexplained laches precluded any
right to specific performance. The statement in the opinion
that "as she [the vendor] could not have compelled specific
performance of the eontract, so specific performance may
not be enforced against her ... [citing Civ. Code § 3386] "
was not necessary to the decision of the case, and is without
support in the authoritieS. It is therefore disapproved by our
decision herein. [3] Section 3386 of the Civil Code, which states
that "Neither party to an obligation can be compelled specifically to perform it, unless the other party thereto has performed, or is compellable specifically to perform, everything
to which the former is entitled under the same obligation ... " codifies the rule of mutuality of remedy that was
well established in' equity jurisprudence at the time of the
adoption of the code. (See, 23 Cal. Jur. 448.) That rule was
never considered applicable where the unavailability of the
remedy to the party against whom relief was sought resulted
from his own default. (Smiddy v.Grafton, supra; Farnum
v. Olarke, supra,' McOowen v. Pew, Supra; Easton v. Montgomery, supra; Swain v. Burnette, supra; Marshall v. Oaldwell, supra; Armstrong v. Sacramento V. R. 00., 52 Cal. App.
110 [198 Pac. 217]. See, also, 28 Cal. L. Rev. 503; 16 CaL
L. Rev. 541; Pomeroy, Specific Performance, 3d ed., p. 903
(1926); 2 Story,' Equity Jurisprudence, 4th ed., p. 457
(1918».
[4] It is contended that the complaint fails to state a cause
of action against Hector and Elizabeth Dyer since they were
not parties to the contract that plaintiffs seek specifically to
enforce. They hold the legal title to the land sought to be
conveyed, however, as trustees for Mabelle Dyer. Since the
latter may be compelled to convey her equitable interest in
the land to plaintiffs and since equity avoids circuity of
action, Hector and Elizabeth Dyer may be compelled to convey the legal title to them. (M'Donald v. Yungbluth, supra;
Miedema v. Wormhoudt, supra; see 33 Harv. L. Rev. 822.)
[5] It is also contended that the complaint fails, to, state a
cause of action against the, title company and the loan association. The title company holds the proceeds of the loan for
the benefit of the party entitled thereto upon the completion
of the transaction. The loan association made the loan, trans-
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mitted the proceeds to the title company,' and received a trust
deed on the land involved. The asserted adverse interests of
both defendants in the property arose out of transactions
with the principal defendant, Mabelle Dyer, concerning her
contract with the plaintiffs. Those interests must, be .determined to give plaintiffs proper relief and to avoid CIrcuity
. '
, .;
of action.
[6] The special demurrer of defendants title company; and
loan association on the grounds of misjoinder of parties defendant and of improper uniting of several causes of action
fails to specify wherein the alleged misjoinder exists. (Healy
v. Visalia db T. R. 00., 101 'Cal. 585 [36 Pac; 125].) [71The'special demurrer of defendants Dyer on the ground that cal1ses
of action for specific performance and for breach ofanagr~~~
mentto convey real property have beeu united improperly
fails to .take into account that the repudiatlonof the contract
gav~rise to a single cause of action regltrdless of the re;m:e~
dies available to plaintiffs.. (Abbott v. 76.Land db Water Qo"
161qal. 42 [118 Pac. 425] ; San Diego Wa~er 00. v .. San Diego
Flume 00., 108 Cal. 54;9 [41 ?ac. 495, 29L. RoA .. 839].)
[8] The contention that the alleged cause of action is barred
by the provisions of subdivision 40£ section 1624 of the Civil
Code b~cause a part of the alleged agr~e:ment for the exchange
of, real property was not in writing i~ .' untenable: The . fact
that Mabelle Dyer's supplementary oral agreement to make
up in cash the amount of the loan deducted by the 'lender
may be unenforceable .loes not prevent, enforcement of the
written contract~ (See cases cited in 12 Cal. Jur. 925.)
The judgments are reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J.,Edmonds, J., and o'arter, J., concurred.
'

[L. A. 18222. In Bank. July 11, 1942.] "
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[1] See 12 Oat Jur. 800; 6 O",tJur. Ten-year SuPp. 60; 37 Am.
Jur.874.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Emmet H. Wilson, Judge. Affirmed.
11:/
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Proceedings in mandamus to eompel reinstatement to a position of an assistant fire chief and to seniority rights and to compel payment of back salary. Judb"ltlent ag-ainst petitioner, entered on the sustaining of a demurrer to a second amended petition, without leave to amend, affirmed.
"
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Joseph K. Coady and Arthur J. Mullen for Appellant.

!

Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney, Frederick von Schrader,
Assistant City Attorney, and Geo. W. Adams and Marvin
Chesebro, Deputies City Attorney, for Respondents.
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TRAYNOR, J. - Petitioner appeals from a judgment
against him entered upon an order sustaining a demurrer,
without leave to amend, to his second amended petition for
writ of mandate ,to compel respondents, members of the
Board of Fire Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, to
reinstate him to the position of assistant fire chief and to his
seniority rights, and to pay the balance on back salary that
he claimed due him. The second amended petition alleges
that petitioner served in the fire department for forty-two
years with an unblemished record, that he was adjudged in
excellent health in the last health examination ordered by
the board, and that he was summoned before the board and
was forced under protest to resign. The circumstances attending this resignation are alleged to be as follows:

"VI
"That your petitioner has not been unlawfully suspended,
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laid off, or discharged from his position as assistant chief of
said Fire Department, but on the contrary, your petitioner
under duress, misrepresentation, fraud and undue influence,
in that he would be deprived of all pension rights, was forced
against his will and desire, to resign from his position with
said department; that on July 1~ 1939, your petitioner, without any notice other than two hours, was summoned before
the Board of Fire Commissioners; that at such time your
petitioner was told that if he did not then and there, within
two hours, resign from his position with the Fire Departrrient,
he would be summarily discharged, and that ifMw'as SO' dis"
charged he would suffer a complete loos of all p'eh:sion 'rights ;
that becaUse of the pressure of duress, misrepresentation,
fraud, and undue influence of complete loss of 'aU pension
,rights, your petitioner did resign under protest;; that no just
or reasonable cause existed that your petitioner 'should have
bee?" resigned, other than fear of loss of pens~ ri~hts with
WhICh he was threatened; that no charges of any kind were
ever preferred against him.

[2] Id.-Officers and Employees-Removal-Reinstatement-Con_
ditions Precedent.-A charter provision requiring the filing of
a demand for reinstatement within a specified time as a condition precedent to an action for reinstatement by a person
claiming to have been unlawfully discharged is applicable to
a discharge which is unlawful because made without good and
sufficient cause and without a hearing.

Ii)!

v.

[20 C. (2d) 531]

requiring a person claiming that he has been unlawfully "suspended, laid-off or discharged" to file a demand for reinstatement within a specified time as a condition precedent to an
action for reinstatement and wages due, although not in terms
mentioning resignations, is applicable to resignations ,under
duress. ,

',ii
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., That at the time your petitioner was forced to retire, he
was informed that four positions as assistant fire chief were
to be eliminated, but the rules of seniority then 'in force and
applicable to petitioner were not applied in the case of your
petitioner.

"VIII
". . . That your petitioner was deprived of his position
arbitrarily and summarily, in that the procedure required
by section 135 of the City Charter was not followed, but by
intimidations, duress and threat of loss of all pension rights,
your petitioner, against his will and without advice, of counsel, .or allowance of time to secure such advice and counsel,
was forced under protest to resign."
About a year after his resignation the petitioner filed a
petition with the board of fire' commissioners for reinstatement to active service and for rehearing of "enforced retirement. " The board demurred on the sole ground that the
petition did not state a cause of action because the petitioner failed to file with the board, pursuant to section 112%
of the charter of the city of Los Angeles, a written demand
for reinstatement within ninety days following the date on
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·which, it was cla~med that he was first illegally, "laid, off,
suspended or discharged."
Section 112% of the charter provides: "Whenever it 'is
claimed by any person that he has been unlawfullysus~
pended, laid off, or discharged, and that such layoff, suspension or discharge is ineffective for any reason, any clai:r~.
for compensation must be made and demand for reinstate~
,ment must be presented in writing within ninety days following the date on which it is claimed that such person was
first illegally, wrongfully or invalidly laid off, suspended,
or discharged. Such demand for reinstatement must be filed
with the board of civil service commissioners and such
claim for compensation for such allegedly wrongful, illegal
or erroneous discharge must be filed with the city clerk. Failure to file such demand for reinstatement within the time
herein specified shall be a bar to any action to compel such
reinstatement and proof of filing such a demand for reinstatement must be completed and proved a condition precedent to the maintenance of any action for reinstatement.
Proof of filing the claim for compensation within the time
and in the manner herein specified shall be a condition precedent to any recovery of wages or salary claimed to be due
on account of said layoff, suspension or discharge."
[1] The petitioner contends that since his separation from
the department was effected by resignation under duress,
and not by unlawful suspension, layoff, or discharge, he
was not required to present a written demand before filing
his petition for a writ of mandate. This contention overlooks the fact that a resignation is characteristically the .voluntary surrender of a position by the one resigning made
freely and not under duress. (People v. Marsh, 30 Cal. App.
424 [159 Pac. 191) ; State ex rel. Young v. Ladeen, 104 Minn.
252 [116 N. W. 486, 16 L. R. A. (NS) 1058).) The absence
of any reference in section 112% to resignations is attributable to the fact that they would ordinarily be voluntary
and not succeeded by demands for refnstatement, not to an
intention to exclude from the limitations of that section demands that follow resignations made under duress. Such
resignations are akin to lay offs, suspensions, or discharges
by virtue of the element of coercion and bear only a formal
resemblance ,to voluntary resignations. Whenever a person
is severed from his employment by coercion the severance is
effected not by his own will but by the will of a superior.

July
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A person who is forced to resign is thus iii the'!p'ositiono,f
one who is discharged, not of one who exerciSes nis own Will
to surrender his employment voluntarily. The tacit Sense of
:action 112% is not that the omission of resignations from
he group of involuntary severances is an' omissionaf
coerced as well as voluntary resignations, but that coerced
resignations fall within the group of involuntary severances;
It is clear from the second amended petition that respon-'
dents demanded petitioner's separation from the fire depart~
ment, that. he was given but two hours to choose betw'een
formal resignation and summary discharge, and tha:the co-p.ld
not choose between remaining with the department or leaving
it. Respondents' and not petitioner's will effected his separation from the department. There is no allegationtha:t the
statements regarding pension rights, elimination of, positions;
or summary discharge were ~ot true and there is therefore
no essential allegation to support a charge of fraud. (See
cases cited in 12 Cal. Jur. 800 Eit seq. and 6 Cal. Jur. Supp.
61.) Fraud is alleged only as a part of the aJlegations, of
duress and threatened loss of pension rights. The paragraphs
of the second amended petition quoted above make it clear
that the petition is based upon allegations of coercion and
duress.
Petitioner's emphasis upon the coercion that forced his
resignation is prompted by the fact that there can be no
reinstatement after a voluntary resignation. (Kramer v. Board
of Police Commissioners, 39 Cal. App. 396 [179 Pac. 216).)
By his own allegations his severance.from his position was a
resignation in name only, and he seeks reinstatement on the
ground that it was in effect not a resignation. His failure to
comply with the conditions of section 112% governing demands for reinstatement compels him to advance his involuntary severance of employment as a resignation exempt from
those conditions. He cannot escape from the dilemma, however, that the coercion attending his nominal resignation;
while affording him a ground for reinstatement, also identines that resignation as an actual involuntary severance froni
employment tantamount to an unlawful discharge within the
meaning of section 112V2 of the city charter. A demand for
reinstatement following severance from employment under'
such circumstances must therefore meet the conditions of that
section.
.
[2] Petitioner argues that if the coerced resignation be

(

536

COMMUNIST PARTY V. PEEK

July 1942]

[20C. (2d)

[20

deemed an unlawful discharge the ninety-day period under section 11272 does not commence to run until the board of fire com~
missioners has complied with section 135 of the city charter
providing that an officer or employee cannot be deprived of
the right to his position without" good and sufficient cause"
and a hearing before a board of rights on charges preferred
agairlsthim. A discharge in violation of section 135, however, would be an unlawful discharge under section 112V2,
which by its express terms applies to discharges claimed to
be "ineffective for any reason," and the ninety-day period
would run from the date of such unlawful discharge.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Carter" J.,
concurred.

[L. A. No. 18354. In Bank. July 11, 1942. )

COMMtJNIS'r PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA et al., Appellants, v. PAUL PEEK, as Secretary of State, etc., et al., Respondents.
[1] Elections -

Political Parties - Capacity to Sue. - A political
party has a right to maintain an action in this state' in its
own name.
[2] Judgments-Declaratory Judgments-Refusal of Relief-Discretion.-It is not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to
refuse to grant declaratory relief consisting of an adjudication of the unconstitutionality of amendments to Election
Code where it appears from the face of the pleading that Elec.
Code, § 2900, provides a speedy and adequate remedy.
[3] Mandamus-Acts Enforceable-Future Acts.-Mandamus will
not lie to prevent the performance of future acts.
[4] Elections-Electors-Right of Su:ffrage.-The right of suffrage, guaranteed by the Constitution, includes the right to
vote at all elections which are now or may hereafter be authorized by law, including the right to vote at primary elections.
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Elections, § 34; [2J Judgments, § 14;
[3J Mandamus, § 6; [4J Elections, § 22; [5, 6J Elections, § 36;
[7, 10-14J Elections, § 36 (4); [8] Evidence, § 12; [9] Evidence, § 18.
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[5] ld.-Nominations-Primary Elections-Legislative Power.Aside from Const. art. II, § 2V2, the Legislature is without
power t9 exclude from participation in a primary election any
citizen who is within the terms of the constitutional provision;
and this includes the denial to a particular political party of the
right to participate in a given election in any situation in which
the party system is an integral part of the election machiner~.
[6] ld.-Nominations-Primary Elections-Legislative PowerScope.-Const. art. II, § 2%, empowering the Legislature to
determine the tests and conditions for participation in primary
elections does not confer upon the Legislature unlimited power
to restrict the constitutional right of suffrage. The legislative
power conferred is limited to prescribing tests and conditions
for participation in. primary elections which are reasonable
and not arbitrary.
[7a, 7b] ld.-Nom~nations-Primary Electi()ns-WhoMay Participate-Communist Party.-Elec. Code, § 2540.3, prohibiting the
recognition of any party using the word' "communist" in its
designation, is unconstitutional as exceeding the limited power
conferred by Const. art. II,§ 2%. The legislation cannot be
sustained upon the theory that it contains an implied legisla~
tive finding that such party advocates a forceful overthrow of
the government, since a statute determining that a particular
person or group has violated the general law is special in
nature, and therefore violates Const. art. IV, § 25, subd. 11.
[8] Evidence-Judicial Notice-Limitations.-Before a court will
take judicial notice of a fact, that fact must be a matter of
common and general knowledge, well established and authoritatively settled, not doubtful or uncertain. The test is whether
sufficient notoriety attaches to the fact to make it proper to
assume its existence without proof.
[9] ld. - Judicial Notice - Communist Party. - A court will not
take judicial notice that the Communist Party advocates the
overthrow of the government by force. (Characterizing as
dictum a statement of In re Coon, 44 Cal. App. (2d) 531, 112
P. (2d) 767.)
[10] Elections-Nominations-Primary Elections-Who May Participate-Affiliation with Communist Party.-The provision of
Elec. Code, § 2540.4, denying participation in primary elections to any party affiliated with the Communist Party of the
United States or the Third Communist International, is speciallegislation and is beyond the power conferred on the Legislature by Const. art. II, § 2%.
[11] old. - Nominations - Primary Elections - Who MayPartici~
pate-Affiliation with Foreign Agency.-The pr,wision of Elec.
[8] See 10 Cal. Jur. 693; 20 Am. Jur. 49.

